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Abstract 
In the view of the growing interest in the role of political patronage in banking, several issues 
are highlighted with regards to performance and behavior of politically connected banks that 
may differ from their non-connected peers. In this article, the effect of political patronage on 
bank risk taking is examined by considering the ratio of loan loss reserves as measure of 
credit risk for a sample of 32 banks in some Middle Eastern and North African MENA 
countries. In general, we find that the presence of political patronage impact significantly 
bank risk, both directly and indirectly, consistent with our hypothesis that politically backed 
banks tend to exploit the moral hazard which, will cause them behave less prudently. 
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1. Introduction 
The “moral hazard” concept has been recently used to qualify the behavior of firms in terms 
of risk as they believe they would be rescued by the government. Faccio (2006) focus on the 
benefits of being politically connected such as extracting rents and having helping hand from 
the government. Inter alia, a greater expectation of receiving government bailout is an 
important gain of political connections. Otherwise, the idea of “too-big-to-fail” is nothing else 
but moral hazard. Large firms are more likely to be refloated by government under the “too 
big to fail” principle that aims to impede contagion by saving firms whose failure could 
imperil the whole financial system. So large firms are also more prone to be politically 
connected (Kostovetsky, 2015). Moreover, as government decisions can be influenced by 
political factors, politically connected companies tend to capitalize on the “moral hazard” 
which motivate them to take more risk. 
The way in which banks perceive risk changing is a key determinant of their prudential 
behavior. For financial participants, it is very important to apprehend the risk of bank. 
Although risk is often seen as a negative aspect of a bank business, it is vital for the banks 
future profitability. According to Haq and Heaney (2012), the evaluation of overall risk of 
bank is important for regulators, bondholders and shareholders. An imprudent risk-taking can 
have serious consequences. When things go away from the appropriate path, the results lead 
to huge losses or even to a bank bankruptcy. 
In this article, we focus on a negative side of political connections in support of the “moral 
hazard” perspective, the incentives that they create for firms to take more risk and reduce their 
prudential behavior. Dam and Koetter (2012) find that risk taking by German banks responds 
to changes in the expectations of government bailout from political connections. Similarly, 
Mariathasan et al. (2014) provide evidence that implicit government guarantees for banks lead 
to risky financing and investment choices. Recently, Ashraf (2017) extends this finding in the 
way that higher political constraints increase moral hazard problems.  
A pioneer work related to political connections, Gomez and Jomo (1997) defines political 
patronage as preferential treatment given to businessmen who are either politicians or 
politically connected to government. Faccio (2010) find that the financial characteristics of 
connected firms vary from those of their non-connected counterparts and that the influence of 
political patronage is more pronounced in emerging countries characterized by high levels of 
corruption and less developed financial system. 
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Therefrom, we argue that the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) setting may be of 
interest for several reasons. Firstly, the phenomenon of political patronage is common in the 
region illustrated by controlling families or regimes and political ties with the government. 
Besides, its impact is greatly identified in countries having high level of corruption and 
lacking of legal protection and strict regulations. Finally, as emerging stock markets in 
MENA region are still less developed, banks play an important role as a major source of 
financing, and further, on the entire economy by establishing the stability of financial system. 
Overall, the political and business infrastructure in this region allow politicians and Royal 
families to be involved in the ownership structure of banks. Hence, the following research 
question emerges: Do political patronage affect bank risk taking in MENA region? 
Our findings are summarized as follows. First, politically connected banks take more risk than 
their non-politically connected counterparts. Second, when we consider both direct and 
indirect effects, the effect of political connection is no longer significant. However, its 
interactions with asset growth and capital respectively appear to be significant. In other 
words, there is and indirect and positive effect of political patronage on risk taking behavior 
of banks. 
Our article adds to the literature in a number of ways. First, it contributes to a small literature 
which attempts to assess the impact of political factors on banks performance and financing 
(Braun and Raddatz, 2010; Carretta et al., 2012; Jackowicz et al., 2013, Hung et al., 2017; 
Braham et al., 2017) and depositor discipline (Disli et al., 2013; Nys et al., 2015) by 
exploring this impact on banks risk taking behavior. Second, this research extends the 
established body of literature on the value of political connections for firms (Faccio, 2006; 
Bliss and Gul, 2012; Lim et al., 2012; Ebrahim et al., 2014) to banking sector and more 
specifically in the MENA region context where this issue, to our knowledge, has not been 
addressed yet, otherwise, we extend the nascent research on risk-taking behavior of MENA 
banks (Srairi, 2013; Lassoued et al., 2016). Finally, this research contributes to the 
methodology in prior studies on bank risk taking behavior. We go beyond evaluating the 
direct link between risk taking behavior and political patronage by examining possible 
indirect effects when interacting political patronage with other variables in the model. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows: section 1 discusses the related literature and 
hypotheses; data and econometric method are described in section 2; section 3 reports the 
empirical results. Finally, the concluding remarks are presented in section 4. 
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2. Related literature on bank risk taking behavior 
2.1. Literature on the impact of ownership 
The risk-taking behavior in banking is important for shareholders and depositors as high level 
of risk taking generates conflicts of interests. Also, controlling for it is vital for the whole 
financial system. 
In the literature related to banks’ behavior, ownership structure is considered as an important 
factor influencing bank risk-taking. One of the pioneer works, Saunders et al. (1990) which 
investigates the relationship between risk taking by ross-section time-series regression for 38 
bank holding companies and their ownership structures during the 1979-1982 period of 
relative deregulation and results suggest that stockholder-controlled banks to have an 
incentive to take greater risk than managerially controlled banks. The relationship between 
bank ownership structure and risk-taking is up to now barely examined. Berger et al. (2005) 
shows evidence that prudential behavior in lending activities improves after banks’ 
privatization in Argentina in the 1990s. Similarly, Dinç (2005) provides empirical evidence 
about the political influences on banks in major emerging markets in the 1990s by comparing 
the different reactions of both types of bank to a political event, the regression analysis 
isolates political influences from many other differences between private banks and 
government owned banks and finds that state-owned banks increase their lending in election 
years compared with private. Besides, Jia (2009) studies the case of Chinese banks using 
firm-level data from 1985 to 2004 for 4 state-owned banks and 10 joint-equity by calculating 
three main ratios from portfolio allocation data such as the bank excess reserves ratio, 
loan/asset ratio and deposit/loan ratio as measures of bank prudence, and finds that state-
owned banks are less prudent than joint-equity ones. Iannotta et al. (2013) uses a sample of 
large European banks and OLS regression analysis to evaluate the impact of government 
ownership on bank risk by comparing risk profiles (default risk and operating risk) of 
government-owned banks with respect to private owned banks and report that the former, 
benefiting from governmental protection, have lower default risk but higher operating risk 
than private banks, and this phenomenon tends to increase in election years. Sapriza et al. 
(2013) use a sample of international rated banks in cross-sectional estimations, results suggest 
that the intensity of government support, by providing explicit or implicit guarantees, is 
associated with more risk taking for banks. Dong et al. (2014) examines the impact of 
ownership structure on Chinese banks' risk-taking behavior based on the types of controlling 
shareholder by estimating ordinary least squares and the system Generalized Method of 
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Moments models and employing three proxies of risk taking (Z-score, ration of non-
performing loans and the capital adequacy ratio), and find that banks controlled by the 
government tend to take more risks than those controlled by state-owned enterprises or private 
investors. Shaban and James (2017) investigates the effects of ownership change on the 
performance and exposure to risk of 60 Indonesian commercial banks over the period 2005-
2012. Analyzing jointly the static, selection and dynamic effects of the major types of 
ownership in the same model of Berger et al. (2005), they find that state-owned banks tend to 
be less profitable and more exposed to risk than private and foreign banks. 
2.2. Literature on MENA region 
However, there are few studies focusing on the effect of banks ownership and risk taking in 
MENA region. For example, Srairi (2013) investigates the impact of ownership structure on 
bank risk of conventional and Islamic banks in 10 MENA countries over the period 2005-
2009. Employing pooled regression models and two risk proxies (non-performing loans ratio 
and Z-score), the result shows a negative association between ownership concentration and 
risk. Also, state-owned banks display greater proportions of non-performing loans than other 
banks. Also, Lassoued et al. (2016) uses also pooled regression model for a sample of 
commercial MENA banks to study the impact of foreign and state ownership on banking risk 
during the period of 2006-2012 and show that state ownership encourages banks to take more 
risks while foreign ownership reduces risk-taking. More specifically, to our knowledge, there 
has been no attempt made to examine the impact of political connections as substitute for 
state-ownership on bank risk taking in this region, which this study attempts to pursue. 
2.3. Literature on political connections 
There is growing literature addressing the issue of political influence on financial system, 
including banks. For example, La Porta et al. (2002) examine a sample of banks operating in 
92 countries around the world in regression analyzes and document that politicians use state-
owned banks to achieve their own political goals. Also, Micco et al. (2007) argue that the 
difference in performance between state-owned banks and private-owned banks in developing 
and industrial countries is politically driven by using bank-level data for the period 1995-2002 
to test whether political factors affects the relationship between ownership and performance. 
Moreover, Igan et al. (2011) examine how US financial institutions with lobbying performed 
in the 2000-2007 period and 2008 and find that they engaged in riskier lending practices than 
their non-lobbying peers prior to the financial crisis. A recent study of Eichler (2016) 
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examines the impact of many political factors such as electoral cycle and government power 
on bank default risk in Eurozone and find that these factors affect the stability of banks. 
The use of political connections is one of these factors. For instance, Carretta et al. (2012) 
examine the impact political presence on the board of Italian cooperative banks in 2006 using 
series of regression models and argue that politicians having influential positions affect 
negatively bank activity measured by net interest revenue, loan portfolio quality and 
capitalization level. In this regard, political connections may be an issue of interest 
specifically for emerging markets. Recently, Braham et al. (2017) examine the impact of 
political patronage on a sample of commercial banks operating in MENA countries using 
panel estimation models and find that politically backed banks tend to have high leverage. 
However, there is a very small literature on the impact of such connections on bank risk 
taking. For example, Qian et al. (2015) use a sample of Chinese commercial banks during 
2006-2010 in a regression model to analyze the relationship between political connections 
from the perspective of “officials-and-directors” and prudential behavior of banks using 
similar proxies to Jia (2009), results suggest that banks with such connections are less 
prudent. Besides, Dam and Koetter (2012) finds that risk taking of German banks is a function 
of bailout expectations as benefits from political connections by developing structural system 
of two equations that relates the probability of expected bailout and bank risk taking. This 
evidence is also supported by Kostovetsky (2015) who examines how political connections 
affect risk-taking behavior of US publicly traded financial firms from 1973 through 2009 by 
using geography-based measure. He finds that politically connected firms have higher 
leverage and their stocks have higher stock volatility and suggests that a “moral hazard-based 
theory” would predict that financial firms with better political connections should take on 
more risk. 
Overall, while numerous studies have been carried out to examine the influence of different 
political factors on banking activities, we will focus on the special case of politically 
patronized banks. At the same time, the relationship between political patronage and firms’ 
performance in general and banks in particular has drawn a great attention from researchers 
and results are mixed due to different approaches and contexts. So, we propose to study the 
impact of the presence of political connections on risk taking in specific case of banking 
sector in MENA region’s context which, to our knowledge, has not been addressed yet. 
Hence, we test the hypothesis that politically patronized banks tend to take more risk. In 
addition, we hypothesize that the effect of political connections on bank risk may be indirect. 
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3. Data, variables and econometric method 
3.1. Data and variables selection 
We use unbalanced panel of annual data from 2003 to 2014 of 32 commercial banks operating 
in 6 MENA countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen and Iran. Financial data and 
key ratios are obtained from bank scope database. Besides, detailed information on political 
backgrounds are hand collected from individual biographies of banks board members. 
We present in table 1 the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
 
Table 1. Variables definition 
variables Definition measurement 
dependent 
variable 
credit_risk The risk of default measured by 
loan loss reserves ratio which 
reflects asset quality. 
loan loss reserves/gross loans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
pol Political connections refer to banks 
which have at least one of their 
owners or directors who is a 
politician or former/current 
government official as well as cases 
of informal ties to a politician, 
minister or government official. 
dummy equals to 1 if the bank 
is politically connected; 0 
otherwise 
prof Profitability measured by the ratio 
of return on average assets 
net income/average of total 
assets 
cap 
Capital as measure of financial 
leverage 
equity/total assets 
eff efficiency cost / income 
 
liq 
Liquidity refers to the extent to 
which customer deposits finance 
customer loans 
loans/deposits 
size Size of the bank total assets 
ag Asset growth (Assett-Assett-1)/ Assett-1 
op_lev Operating leverage fixed assets/total assets 
state ownership (state or private-owned) dummy equals to 1 if the bank 
is state owned; 0 otherwise 
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3.2. Econometric method 
In order to test our hypothesis on the impact of political patronage on bank risk taking, we 
estimate Panel data linear regression: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9
_
_ ,
it it it it it it it it
it it i it
credit risk c pol prof cap eff liq size ag
op lev state
      
   
       
   
 (1) 
where i denotes bank (i=1,2… 32), t denotes year (t=2003…2014), c is the constant term, 
β1… β9 are the parameters to be estimated, µi is the unobserved time-invariant individual 
effect and ε is the error term. 
As a first step, in panel data, it appears necessary to verify the homogeneous or heterogeneous 
specification of the model to determine if the parameters are perfectly identical or vary across 
individuals. Under Stata, Fisher test with the null hypothesis of absence of individual effects 
is directly performed when running the fixed effect model estimation. Then, two panel 
estimation methods are performed using fixed effects and random effects models. 
Statistically, the Hausman (1978) test is done to select the appropriate method of estimation 
with the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the efficient random effects 
estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator. 
Furthermore, there may be indirect links between risk and political patronage through 
interactions with other variables of the regression. To examine these effects, we interact the 
variable of political patronage with each of the control variables, we also add the quadratic 
specification of the variable as in the following regression: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2
1 3 4 5 6
7 8 9
_ _
_
it it it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it
it it
credit risk c pol prof cap eff liq size ag op lev state
pol prof pol cap pol eff pol liq pol size pol
ag pol op lev pol state po
        
     
  
         
          
      ,it i itl   
 (2) 
where α and δ are the regression coefficients of independent variables. 
The starting point is to estimate the initial specification including all variables. Then, based on 
statistical significance of the independent variables, we eliminate the less significant one and 
we repeat the procedure of estimation until we conclude with only significant variables. 
3.3. Multicollinearity tests 
Within the empirical framework, we present descriptive statistics and correlation analysis of 
the variables. In addition, multicollinearity tests are performed: First, the Variance Inflation 
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Factor (VIF) where the problem of multicollinearity is detected if VIF has a value of 5 or 10 
and above and / or the average of VIF is greater than or equal to 2; Second, collinearity 
diagnostic procedures (BKW) proposed by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) where the 
variance-decomposition proportions can be used to identify the source of collinearity 
associated with large value of condition indexes. According to Erkel-Rousse (1995), the 
threshold of 30 is representative of an “acute” situation of multicollinearity. In fact, a 
significant problem can be revealed when one or more condition indices have a value greater 
than or equal to 20. While, a situation of "light" multicollinearity is detected when the value 
of a condition index is greater than 10 or even 5. A situation where a condition index has a 
value greater than 30 and has on the corresponding line at least two proportions of 
decomposition of the variances greater than the value 0.5 is called "close dependence" and 
leads to the existence of a phenomenon of multicollinearity between the variables concerned. 
 
4. Results 
In this section, we present and analyze different estimations results in detail. However, it is 
necessary to conduct a preliminary analysis for the study sample. 
4.1. Preliminary analysis 
Table 2 provides the summary statistics (average, standard deviation, maximal value and 
minimal value) for the study sample period from 2003 to 2014, including all variables used. 
 
Table2. Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
credit_risk 306 9.308448 8.145424 .07 42.047 
prof 335 1.139666 1.446619 -9.92 12.988 
pol 359 .4401114 .4970932 0 1 
size 335 39732.71 280624.3 .9618691 2999745 
cap 335 10.07227 5.932866 -1.025 48.617 
eff 335 52.79689 18.55263 14.463 179.31 
liq 335 72.55561 59.76004 7.15 502.08 
state 359 .1225627 .3283922 0 1 
ag 327 15.28596 15.11906 -21.85 94.87 
op_lev 334 .0173478 .0153186 .0018294 .1526072 
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We also conduct correlation analysis between each pair of the variables used in the study to 
make sure that none of them are highly correlated. Table 3 presents Pearson correlation 
coefficients and the level of statistical significance (p-value) based on its subsequent test with 
the null hypothesis that the correlation is not statistically significant. Credit risk is negatively 
correlated with all variables except for efficiency, state ownership and political patronage. 
Also, the results show that the coefficients of correlation do not exceed the value of 0.5, 
except for liquidity and capital, the correlation coefficient is 0.5690. 
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix of variables 
 
Credit risk prof pol size cap eff liq state ag op_lev 
Credit_risk 1.0000  
         
prof -0.2384 1.0000  
        
 
0.0000 
         
pol 0.1064 0.0970 1.0000  
       
 
0.0630 0.0762 
        
size -0.1137 -0.0178 -0.1049 1.0000  
      
 
0.0469 0.7460 0.0551 
       
cap -0.1090 0.3556 -0.0561 -0.0552 1.0000  
     
 
0.0569 0.0000 0.3063 0.3139 
      
eff 0.0305 -0.4993 -0.1843 0.0528 -0.1745 1.0000  
    
 
0.5952 0.0000 0.0007 0.3352 0.0013 
     
liq -0.0028 0.0608 -0.1014 -0.0361 0.5690 0.1578 1.0000  
   
 
0.9606 0.2670 0.0638 0.5106 0.0000 0.0038 
    
state 0.1929 0.0214 -0.3314 -0.0470 0.0507 -0.0402 -0.0325  1.0000  
  
 
0.0007 0.6959 0.0000 0.3909 0.3546 0.4634 0.5534 
   
ag -0.1996 0.2710 -0.0818 0.0162 0.1877 -0.1156 0.2394 -0.1942 1.0000  
 
 
0.0005 0.0000 0.1401 0.7700 0.0006 0.0367 0.0000 0.0004 
  
op_lev -0.0049 0.0185 -0.1125 -0.0081 0.1214 0.2923 0.2363 0.0286 0.2124 1.0000  
 
0.9321 0.7366 0.0399 0.8831 0.0265 0.0000 0.0000 0.6024 0.0001 
 This table lists the p-value of the correlation test below each correlation coefficient among the variables. 
 
Along with correlation matrix, tests of multicollinearity are performed. First, the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) test is presented in Table 4.  
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Table 4. Test VIF 
Variable VIF SQRT 
VIF 
Tolerance R-Squared Eigenvalue Condition 
Index 
credit_risk 1.22 1.10 0.8199 0.1801      2.0604 1.0000 
prof 1.80 1.34 0.5545 0.4455    1.8142 1.0657 
pol 1.35 1.16 0.7407 0.2593    1.3054 1.2563 
size 1.03 1.02 0.9699 0.0301     1.2146 1.3024 
cap 1.91 1.38 0.5229 0.4771     0.9413 1.4795 
eff 1.64 1.28 0.6101 0.3899     0.8620 1.5461 
liq 1.86 1.36 0.5381 0.4619     0.7192 1.6926 
state 1.35 1.16 0.7404 0.2596     0.4299 2.1892 
ag 1.31 1.14 0.7645 0.2355    0.3487 2.4309 
op_lev 1.25 1.12 0.8022 0.1978     0.3043 2.6021 
Mean VIF 1.47  Condition Number 2.6021  
 
In this case, the VIF values vary between (1.03) and (1.91) and the average equals to (1.47). 
This implies the absence of the problem of multi-collinearity. 
Second, BKW test based on the interrelationships among the independent variables is 
performed.  Table 5 lists Condition Indexes and Variance-Decomposition Proportions. The 
singular values in the second column of the table are condition indexes.  
 
Table 5. Test BKW 
 condition index credit_risk prof pol size cap eff liq state ag op_lev 
1 1.00 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.02 
2 1.07 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.07 
3 1.26 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.24 0.04 0.00 
4 1.30 0.08 0.02 0.18 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.00 
5 1.48 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.13 0.28 
6 1.55 0.33 0.01 0.07 0.48 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.10 
7 1.69 0.15 0.07 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.35 0.22 
8 2.19 0.02 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.44 0.36 0.18 
9 2.43 0.26 0.54 0.20 0.00 0.06 0.43 0.09 0.17 0.01 0.08 
10 2.60 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.02 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.04 
The table lists Condition Indexes and Variance-Decomposition Proportions. The singular values in the 
second column of the table are condition indexes. 
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Condition indices presented in Table 5 are lower than, the values are between 1 and 2.6 for all 
variables. Hence, the issue of multicollinearity does not a challenge for our study. 
 
4.2. Estimation results 
Table 6 presents the estimation results of fixed and random effects linear models from using 
loan loss reserves ratio, a measure of credit risk as the dependent variable (a higher value of 
loan loss reserves indicates high risk-taking). The calculated Fischer statistic is listed in table 
6 below. The p-value of F-statistic is equal to 0.000 and the null hypothesis is rejected, so we 
have to include individual effects in the model. The p-value of Hausman statistic which is 
equal to 0.0738 demonstrates that random effects method is more appropriate for our model. 
The results from the random effects model show that capital is significant at 1% and 
negatively related to risk, while operating leverage is positively significant at 1%. That is high 
level of equity implies more prudent bank behavior and less risk taking. The positive effect of 
operating leverage on risk is similar to the findings of Lassoued et al. (2016) stating that 
operating leverage as financial leverage increases bank risk. Political connections and state 
ownership have a positive relation with risk and significant at 10%. As the results of Berger et 
al. (2005) and Srairi (2013) state owned banks have poorer loan quality and higher default 
risk than private banks. Besides, politically connected banks take more risk than non-
connected ones and these consistent with our hypothesis that politically backed banks will 
tend to exploit the moral hazard which will eventually cause them to take extra risk. 
 
Table 6. Fixed and Random effect model estimation 
 
variable 
Fixed effect model Random effect model 
Coef. Std. Err. t Coef. Std. Err. z 
prof -.405353 .3185953 -1.27 -.5282119 .3237423 -1.63 
pol - - - 3.864513* 2.335748 1.65 
cap -.4165295*** .107597 -3.87 -.3239119*** .1019588 -3.18 
size 3.24e-07 1.45e-06 0.22 -1.82e-07 1.40e-06 -0.13 
eff .0142634 .020743 0.69 .0072845 .0210764 0.35 
liq .0013295 .0123776 0.11 .0014539 .0110794 0.13 
state - - - 6.093916* 3.483949 1.75 
ag -.0314666 .0223544 -1.41 -.0284447 .0228256 -1.25 
op_lev 259.8606*** 44.69411 5.81 204.8943*** 41.09408 4.99 
constant 9.50671*** 1.889168 5.03 6.853546*** 2.488759 2.75 
F (31,259) 23.63 - 
13 
 
Prob>F 0.000 - 
Within R² 
Between R² 
Overall R² 
0.1722 
0.0000 
0.0144 
0.1689 
0.0429 
0.0788 
σ_ui 
σ_ei 
rho 
7.9289885 
4.2406333 
.77758115 
5.7368373 
4.2406333 
.64666022 
Hausman chi2(6) 
Prob>chi2 
11.51 
0.0738 
rho is the intraclass correlation (the fraction of variance due to differences across panels. σ_ei and σ_ui are the 
standard deviations of residuals (overall error term) and residuals within groups. 
*, **, *** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
Then, in order to test the statistical significance of explanatory variables, we proceed to 
iterative elimination of statistically insignificant coefficient of variables. We restart the 
regression with one less insignificant variable until we end with 5 significant variables as in 
shown in (5). 
Table 7 presents detailed results from different estimations. Results with respect to the latest 
estimation are the same to table 6 except for profitability which become significant at 5%. 
The effect of profitability is negative indicating that more profitable banks are less likely to 
fail (Psillaki et al., 2010). Capital is negatively related to risk while political connections, 
state and operating leverage have positive coefficients. This confirms our previous results. 
 
Table 7. Random effect model iterative estimation 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
prof -.52821188 -.53373524* -.53852268* -.56679868** -.67708273** 
pol 3.864513* 3.887071* 3.8705437* 3.8229455 4.0413866* 
cap -.32391195*** -.32057942*** -.31786693*** -.33365727*** -.32597058*** 
size -1.819e-07     
eff .00728448 .00714636 .00735885   
liq .00145386 .00148275    
state 6.093916* 6.1186336* 6.1007887* 6.0488151 6.3957985* 
ag -.02844472 -.02820419 -.02812268 -.02970809  
op_lev 204.89431*** 203.08932*** 204.10169*** 213.6762*** 206.05037*** 
constant 6.853546*** 6.8378568*** 6.8973547*** 7.3504169*** 6.9984583*** 
(1) estimation of the model including all variables, (2) to (5) estimations with one less insignificant variable 
*, **, *** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
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In addition, an estimation of our model with standardized variables is added to the results of 
table 7 to remove the effect of the unit of measure. The estimated coefficients are relative to 
the contribution of corresponding variables on the model. Results are presented in Table 8.  
 
Table 8. Estimation of model (5) with standardized variables 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
prof -.1202492** .0491125 -2.45 0.014 
pol .2466349* .1486033 1.66 0.097 
cap -2.2374265*** .0675788 -3.51 0.000 
state .257854* .146734 1.76 0.079 
op_lev .3875062*** .0740737 5.23 0.000 
constant -.0279698 .1391516 -0.20 0.841 
Within R² 
Between R² 
Overall R² 
0.1639 
0.0401 
0.0761 
σ_ui 
σ_ei 
rho 
.75146638 
.51662634 
.67905083 
rho is the intraclass correlation (the fraction of variance due to differences across panels. σ_ei and σ_ui are the 
standard deviations of residuals (overall error term) and residuals within groups. 
*, **, *** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
 
We note that there is a clear dominance of “cap” variable. However, the variable of “pol” is 
not negligible compared to other variables like state ownership or profitability. 
Regarding the analysis of possible nonlinear and indirect effects, we first estimate the second 
model that includes the quadratic and interactive terms. Table 9 shows the results of fixed and 
random effect estimations. Based Hausman test, we retain the fixed effects model. 
 
Table 9. Estimations with quadratic and interactive terms 
 
variables 
Fixed effect model Random effect model 
Coef. Std. Err. t Coef. Std. Err. z 
prof -.2951139 .3942481 -0.75 -.3883442 .4098886 -0.95 
pol - - - -.5372411 5.081647 -0.11 
pol² - - - - - - 
pol×prof .4563572 .6826894 0.67 .1196103 .6967041 0.17 
pol×cap .3141189 .2327443 1.35 .1820346 .2280544 0.80 
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pol×size .0001495 .0001108 1.35 .0001221 .0001033 1.18 
pol×ag .0635351 .044694 1.42 .0593004 .0460974 1.29 
pol×eff -.0543581 .0464896 -1.17 -.0481089 .0472469 -1.02 
pol×liq .0726593* .0428739 1.69 .036549 .0381113 0.96 
pol×state - - - - - - 
pol×op_lev 147.1472 99.48451 1.48 53.12976 92.76796 0.57 
size 3.64e-07 1.43e-06 0.26 -1.75e-07 1.40e-06 -0.13 
cap -.4998609*** .1281796 -3.90 -.3660765*** .1223878 -2.99 
eff .0592861 .0390702 1.52 .0448261 .039423 1.14 
liq -.0071355 .0128743 -0.55 -.0024089 .0119593 -0.20 
state - - - 5.989508* 3.559618 1.68 
ag -.0569295* .0316444 -1.80 -.0512038 .0326213 -1.57 
op_lev 249.0946*** 53.21131 4.68 206.5823*** 51.50323 4.01 
constant 4.794235** 2.341347 2.05 5.741699* 3.417606 1.68 
Within R² 
Between R² 
Overall R² 
0.2305 
0.0047 
0.0176 
0.2219 
0.0202 
0.0523 
σ_ui 
σ_ei 
rho 
9.6383889 
4.1449441 
.84392531 
5.7313149 
4.1449441 
.65658473 
Hausman chi2(9) 
Prob>chi2 
28.73 
0.0007 
rho is the intraclass correlation (the fraction of variance due to differences across panels. σ_ei and σ_ui are the 
standard deviations of residuals (overall error term) and residuals within groups. 
*, **, *** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
 
Accounting for the nonlinear effect, the quadratic term of “pol” is omitted from the estimation 
results and this may be due to collinearity problem. It is obvious that the variables of “pol” 
and “pol²” will be highly correlated, however, in this case, it is not necessary to deal the 
collinearity problem in the model since the second variable is nonlinear function of the first 
one. 
Respecting the other variables added, the coefficients of the interactive terms between 
political connections and other variables are insignificant except for liquidity which is 
statistically significant at 10% and positive. The ratio of total loans to total deposits reflects 
the extent to which customer deposits finance loans. A high ratio indicates high credit risk for 
banks. In this case, less liquid politically connected banks will be more likely to fail. 
Operating leverage is also positively significant at 1%. The variables of capital and asset 
growth are negative and significant at 1% and 10% level respectively. Banks with increasing 
growth of assets can diversify their risk because they have more future opportunities, variety 
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of loans and other activities. According to Dohner (1991), growth opportunities may add 
value and sense of success to firms and attract additional business. 
Then we proceed to iterative elimination of statistically insignificant coefficients of the 
variables to end with 5 significant variables. Detailed estimations of the iterative procedures 
are presented in table 11a and table 11b (see Appendix). Table 10 presents only the final 
estimation including 5 significant variables. 
 
Table 10. Fixed effect model estimation 
(including only significant variables) 
credit_risk Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
pol - - - - 
pol2 - - - - 
pol×cap .5202665** .2154653 2.41 0.016 
pol×ag .101805** .0413302 2.46 0.014 
pol×state - - - - 
cap -.6117276*** .1150848 -5.32 0.000 
state - - - - 
ag -.090253*** .0284457 -3.17 0.002 
op_lev 280.9567*** 43.17389 6.51 0.000 
_cons 9.491848*** 1.216883 7.80 0.000 
Within R² 
Between R² 
Overall R² 
0.01971 
0.0024 
0.0156 
σ_ui 
σ_ei 
rho 
8.6213766 
4.1602025 
.81112887 
rho is the intraclass correlation (the fraction of variance due to differences across panels. σ_ei and σ_ui are the 
standard deviations of residuals (overall error term) and residuals within groups. 
*, **, *** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
 
Capital and asset growth are negatively significant at 1% while operating leverage is positive. 
These results are also similar to the results provided by previous estimations. The interactive 
variable between liquidity and political connections is no longer significant. However, the 
interactive terms relative to capital and asset growth are statistically significant at 5% and 
positive. 
There are a number of difference in the results obtained in the estimation compared to those 
reported in the previous estimations reported in tables 6,7 and 8. First, the coefficient of 
profitability is no longer significant. Second, while the coefficients of capital and asset growth 
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appear to be significant and negative, their corresponding terms interacted with political 
connections are significant indicating an indirect effect of political patronage on risk through 
asset growth and capital, and this effect is positive. In other words, politically connected 
banks with high level of equity and high growth of assets have high level of credit risk. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This article examines the impact of political connection on risk taking behavior of banks in 
MENA region. For this purpose, we employ linear panel data analysis on a sample of 32 
MENA banks for the period 2003-2014, in which the impact of political connections along 
with some control variables on credit risk is assessed in the first step. In the second step, we 
implement iterative estimations. Generally, we find that politically connected MENA banks 
take more risk than their non-politically connected counterparts in line with the results of 
Qian et al. (2015) that the special political connections of officials and boards lower the 
prudential behavior of banks. Regarding the analysis of indirect effects, we interact political 
connections with other determinants. An interesting result is that while there is no direct effect 
of political connections on risk, its interaction with asset growth and capital respectively 
appear to be significant. Hence, there is and indirect and positive effect of political patronage 
on risk taking behavior. Compared to studies involving the MENA region, mainly Lassoued et 
al. (2016) and Srairi (2013), we find that political connections as substitute for state-
ownership has a similar impact on bank risk taking behavior. Yet, we provide evidence of 
possible indirect impact of political ties which has not been addressed in previous studies. 
Overall, this study suggests that the association between bank risk and political connections 
for supports the moral hazard-based theory predicting that firms with better political 
connections should take more risk. Our main result is in line with studies dealing with non-
MENA context (Dam and Koetter, 2012; Mariathasan, 2014; Kostovestky, 2015). The idea is 
that politically backed firms tend to behave less prudently as they believe they would be 
bailed out by the government.  
This research has several implications globally, and for the MENA region in particular 
because political patronage is common but more pronounced in states with high level of 
corruption and where politicians and royal families are involved in the board of banks. For 
banking industry, the politician-bank network should be carefully considered by regulators 
and market participants. Banks tend to exploit the moral hazard through their connections to 
maximize their value and engage in less efficient and riskier activities as they expect to be 
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bailed out by the government in case of distress. Thus, the regulator should monitor these 
banks and ensure their competitiveness and efficiency. 
 
Appendix 
Table 11a. Fixed effect model iterative estimations 
Variables (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
prof -.29511389 -.29606974 -.25690717 -.12050084  
pol - - - - - 
pol² - - - - - 
pol×prof .4563572 .45731305 .41815048   
pol×cap .31411889 .31549521 .33836621 .37054673* .36798973* 
pol×size .00014945 .00014981 .00014981 .00015238 .00015129 
pol×ag .06353508 .06436483 .0648502 .06925101 .06996159 
pol×eff -.05435806 -.05319879 -.05296289 -.06384937 -.0668709 
pol×liq .07265934* .07263653* .0655238 .05905698 .06182282 
pol×state - - - - - 
pol×op_lev 147.14717 146.90143 139.85467 144.30177 145.59961 
size 3.641e-07     
cap -.49986092*** -.50123724*** -.52410824*** -.53265568*** -.54020645*** 
eff .05928609 .05812683 .05789092 .06374683* .06891991** 
liq -.00713554 -.00711273    
ag -.05692953* -.05775928* -.05824465* -.06022223* -.06196921** 
state - - - - - 
op_lev 249.09463*** 249.34037*** 256.38713*** 253.94654*** 251.79052*** 
constant 4.7942347** 4.8547693** 4.6117783** 4.7647108** 4.4913154** 
Aic(1) 1673.1694 1671.2466 1669.6072 1668.0547 1666.2236 
Bic(2) 1728.6258 1723.0059 1717.6694 1712.4198 1706.8916 
(6) estimation including all variables, (7) to (10) estimations with one less insignificant variable 
*, **, *** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
(1) Akaike Information Criteria. (2) Bayesian Information Criteria. 
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Table 11b. Fixed effect model iterative estimations 
Variables (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
prof      
pol - - - - - 
pol² - - - - - 
pol×prof      
pol×cap .3822666* .39604156* .44675933** .4448842** .52026653** 
pol×size .000118     
pol×ag .07974917* .07311648* .08962944** .09656746** .10180499** 
pol×eff -.06247165 -.06392907    
pol×liq .06141748 .06323066 .06817441* .06152438  
pol×state - - - - - 
pol×op_lev      
cap -.56051077*** -.55741089*** -.59018279*** -.6127698*** -.61172761*** 
size      
eff .07028512** .07007669** .02518237   
liq      
ag -.06752958** -.06668067** -.08121134*** -.0905467*** -.09025303*** 
state - - - - - 
op_lev 291.23619*** 285.21398*** 278.75369*** 282.87704*** 280.95669*** 
constant 4.8654207** 5.2872745** 6.4529915*** 8.1876968*** 9.4918476*** 
Aic(1) 1666.7959 1666.1788 1666.8765 1666.884 1667.8166 
Bic(2) 1703.7668 1699.4527 1696.4533 1692.7636 1689.9992 
 (11) to (15) estimations with one less insignificant variable 
*, **, *** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
(1) Akaike Information Criteria. (2) Bayesian Information Criteria. 
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